February 10, 2011diplomacyForeign AffairsIndiamilitary-jihadi complexPakistan

Reality and composite dialogue

Why India is talking to Pakistan again and why it won’t achieve anything

This is an archived blog post from The Acorn.

Samanth Subramanian’s report in The National quotes my comments on New Delhi’s decision to resume the-composite-dialogue-but-we-won’t-call-it that with Pakistan:

Not calling the new talks a resumption of composite dialogue” is important for both countries, said Nitin Pai, a fellow at the Takshashila Institution, an independent strategic-affairs think tank based in Chennai. The Indian side will look at each of the six or seven rounds of discussions, before the foreign ministers’ meeting, as a hurdle that Pakistan has to cross. The Pakistani side will say that it has resumed dialogue and gotten what it wants,” Mr Pai said. From a purely diplomatic point of view, it’s a success to have broken the logjam.”

Mr Pai said the friction between the countries comes from India’s disconnect between reality and the Indian government’s approach towards whatever is happening in Pakistan. You would expect things to move with reciprocity—create good faith, then take small steps”.

Instead, he said, the Indian government driven by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, is pursuing a dogmatic approach—that they have to pursue talks”. For this reason, he said, he expects nothing concrete” to come out of them. [The National]

This warrants a more detailed post. At the political level, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh waited until public memory of 26/11 faded to a level that it was politically feasible for him to resume the bilateral dialogue that he was compelled to suspend in December 2009. Whether at Sharm-el-Sheikh or at Thimphu last year, Dr Singh has dogmatically pursued dialogue with Pakistan, bending over backwards and in the face of Pakistani brazenness of epic proportions.

Faith is oblivious to facts or reason. The fact that the pompous poseurs that pass off as Pakistan’s civilian government are powerless to deliver on anything (other than meeting for talks and track-2’s) is immaterial to India’s prime minister. That General Ashfaq Kayani cannot wind down the military’s jihadi components even in the unlikely event that he wants to is lost on him. He is unconcerned that the rapid growth of Pakistan’s China-backed nuclear arsenal and US-financed conventional armoury suggests intentions inimical to rapprochement. No, Dr Manmohan Singh just wants to solve all problems by dialogue. Therefore the disconnect between India’s policy approach and objective reality.

The challenge for India’s diplomats was not so much to agree to talks with Pakistan and invite the insufferable Shah Mehmood Qureshi to New Delhi. Those were given. It was about how to do it in a manner that will not be seen as a complete cave-in to Pakistani demands. They achieved it by splitting the difference. The Pakistani side got the composite dialogue that they wanted without having to try or imprison anyone remotely connected with the 26/11 terrorist attacks. The Indian side can say that, well, we will ensure that the Pakistanis will jump seven hurdles before we make you suffer the insufferable Mr Qureshi in July.

Once a date is suggested for Mr Qureshi’s visit, the expectation is set. Whether or not the Pakistanis cross the seven hurdles, it will be extremely difficult—okay, practically impossible—for New Delhi to call off the foreign ministers’ meeting. The only hope that we’ll be spared Mr Qureshi’s obnoxious posturing is if someone else gets appointed foreign minister before then*.

Don’t believe all the solutions agreed to in track-2’s or track-1’s or track-0’s. They aren’t worth the paper they are printed on. Those who believe such promises need to understand the concept of counterparty risk. It is not a coincidence that the all-powerful General Pervez Musharraf’s political decline began around the time he presented his back-channel proposals to the Pakistani army leadership.

While talks and dialogue might impress the international community with the masochistic capabilities of India’s foreign policy, they will amount to nothing. You can’t hope to achieve much by negotiating with the dog. You must negotiate with its master.

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