The Stimson Center has come out with a scholarly work on nuclear risk-reduction and confidence building on the subcontinent. The book is downloadable from the Center’s website.
Nuclear crises are repetitive in South Asia because their outcomes are not decisive, the contestants learn different lessons from close calls, unsatisfactory outcomes are not acknowledged, and new ventures are not foreclosed. Until a process of reconciliation is underway, the next crisis always waits in the wings.
Despite – or perhaps because of – the inconclusive resolution of crises, some in Pakistan and India continue to believe that gains can be secured below the nuclear threshold. Pakistan has sought gains by unconventional methods. New Delhi is now contemplating gaining advantage through limited war. These tactics reinforce each other, and both lead to dead ends. If the primary alternative to an ambiguous outcome in the next crisis is a loss of face or a loss of territory, the prospective loser will seek to change the outcome. In South Asia, misery loves company.
These circumstances leave much to chance. When unsettled accounts produce yet another crisis, the outcome cannot be confidently predicted. While efforts will again be made to keep the crisis from reaching a boiling point or to prevent unintended escalation, these plans might fail. The unexpected becomes commonplace during crises and military campaigns. [Stimson Center]
If you would like to share or comment on this, please discuss it on my GitHub
Previous © Copyright 2003-2024. Nitin Pai. All Rights Reserved.