May 5, 2025 ☼ The Intersection ☼ foreign policy ☼ geopolitics
Atrocious terrorist attacks do not change the overall direction of India's prevalence in the contest with Pakistan
This is from The Intersection column that appears every other Monday in Mint.
At this time, when there is widespread anticipation of a military retaliation by India in response to the atrocious terrorist attack in Pahalgam, it is useful to take a step back and look at the scoreboard. In the decades-old conflict with Pakistan, India is winning. Recognising this is important, for then we can reinforce success factors and avoid mistakes.
At the outset, let me be clear: the use of military force against targets in Pakistan is called for and well-justified. If India’s political leadership assesses that the risk of war is acceptable, then a sharp operation that hurts without humiliating the Pakistani army will ensure that the cost of cross-border terrorism remains high. The political objective would be to cause enough damage on the other side and absorb the ensuing retaliation by Pakistan. This will reinforce the message that the Pakistani establishment does not enjoy impunity regardless of its geopolitical alliances or its nuclear weapons.
Why do I say India is winning? The Pakistani establishment has clearly not changed it stripes since the 1980s when it ramped up its investment terrorism and proxy war against India. What has changed is the world’s response to it.
I still recall the 1990s when, after a terrorist attack in Kashmir, Washington would blithely support the Pakistani position and protect Islamabad from military and political retaliation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, among other countries in West Asia, would provide the financial reassurance that emboldened the Pakistani army. The international community would equate terrorists and their victims and ask both sides to de-escalate. Prominent political leaders in Kashmir, led by the Hurriyat, would sympathise with the terrorists. In Pakistan, cross-border terrorism enjoyed considerable public support and was popular as a policy.
Now consider what happened after the Baisaran killings. The US president’s first reaction was to support the Indian position. Saudi Arabia and the UAE enjoy close ties with New Delhi and are unlikely to provide encouragement or solace to Pakistani generals or terrorist groups. Global public opinion has no patience for terrorism. Kashmiri people came out on the streets to protest against the terrorists. Few Kashmiri politicians have openly backed terrorism. And, from my limited sense of elite Pakistani opinion, people there seem to be more fatigued than enthused by the act of terrorism. Even the terrorists who claimed responsibility quickly backtracked once they realised that the attack didn’t play out as they had expected.
It is too early to tell, but I will not be surprised if Indian tourists return to Kashmir in the coming months. When that happens, it will be yet another sign that India is winning. As for Pakistan, even if China and Turkey stand behind Pakistan today, Islamabad will find it much harder to secure international assistance to shore up its crisis-ridden economy.
India’s success is not an accident. It comes as the result of a consistent approach — a grand strategy — that focuses on building economic strength, engaging Pakistan’s foreign sponsors, investing in security infrastructure (like the border fence), conducting democratic politics and, finally, judiciously using military force. We can date this approach either to 1991-92 or 1999-2000. In any case, without making doctrinal declarations and advertising it as a shrink-wrapped ‘strategy’, New Delhi has employed a set of policy options that have allowed India gain an upper hand in its contest with Pakistan. The approach is bipartisan and each government has added a new element to the strategy.
What are the pitfalls to avoid?
One, as we have known from the time of the Partition, the most important thing is for India not to allow the external conflict with Pakistan to reverberate into domestic strife. Demolishing homes belonging to alleged terrorists is counterproductive at a time when Kashmiri public opinion has turned against terrorists.
Two, the information dimension needs careful management. Not every signal needs to be sent on loudspeakers. Not every verbal taunt needs to be responded to.
Three, we should recognise that the Pakistani military-jihadi complex and the nominal Pakistani state are two distinct entities. New Delhi’s approach must take into the dynamics of the relationship between the two. What worked in the Imran Khan-Qamar Javed Bajwa regime did not quite work in the Shehbaz Sharif-Asim Munir dispensation.
It is not my purpose to offer a saccharine coated story that makes everyone feel good. Rather, it is important that we recognise that if we stay the course, we will be able to diminish the impact of Pakistani mischief on India’s future. Rawalpindi’s generals would like nothing better to suck India into the morass of proxy conflict and exploit religious faultlines to weaken Indian society. They will not be easily deterred. Neither military force nor economic straits have stopped them. Preventing the military-jihadi complex from carrying out cross-border terrorism is therefore a multi-dimensional, perennial, round-the-clock activity that India must doggedly persist in over the long term.
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