June 2, 2025 ☼ The Intersection ☼ geopolitics ☼ defence policy ☼ foreign affairs
Detangling the confusion from inappropriate use of the term deterrence.
This is from The Intersection column that appears every other Monday in Mint.
One of the biggest misconceptions about the recently suspended military conflict between India and Pakistan has been around the concept of deterrence. A number of commentators have used it as frame to assess the objectives and outcomes of the brief but intense bout of warfare between the two countries. Some have argued that the terrorist attack in Pahalgam marks a failure of deterrence. Others claim that Operation Sindoor restored that deterrence. Yet others claim that Sindoor itself is a failure because it will not prevent Pakistan from instigating terrorist attacks in the future. Much of the confusion comes from the lazy — and inappropriate — use of the term deterrence in the context of terrorism and its punishment.
Deterrence is a situation when an adversary is persuaded not to take a particular action by holding out a threat of punishment. In the context of India and Pakistan, we can say that there is mutual nuclear deterrence because each side knows that it will suffer severe, unacceptable damage. So neither side will use nuclear weapons unless its red lines are crossed. These red lines are deliberately set very high: India will not use nuclear weapons unless it is first attacked with them. Pakistan will use them only if its existence is threatened.
Now here’s the point: the existence of nuclear deterrence does not mean other types of conflicts are also deterred. Since the mid-1980s, Pakistan believed — and convinced many foreign strategists — that it could use its nuclear weapons to deter a conventional military attack. This emboldened its leaders to pursue a proxy war first in Punjab and later in Jammu & Kashmir with impunity. The calculation was that nuclear weapons not only neutralised India’s stronger conventional forces, but also gave Pakistan the impunity to promote terrorism and insurgency.
The post-Uri surgical strikes, the Balakot operation and Operation Sindoor showed that Pakistan can no longer believe that it can deter India at the conventional level. Sindoor, particularly, demonstrated New Delhi’s willingness and capacity to hit Pakistani targets along the entire length of the border. Contrary to subsequent media hype, the targets were chosen to keep the nuclear angle out of the picture. The message is clear: nuclear weapons do not deter India from engaging in conventional warfare at a punitive intensity.
India, for its part, had never been able to deter Pakistan from using terrorism. The bad news is that despite the military response it will remain nearly impossible to do so in the future. As I’ve argued in recent columns, India has over the past three decades raised Pakistan’s costs, leading to a reduction in the frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks. Operation Sindoor ratchets up those costs significantly. It is possible to ratchet them higher but unfortunately, never to a level that are prohibitive to the other side. So it is a matter of time before another Pakistani general is tempted to take another — albeit more expensive — shot at their old game. Operation Sindoor is thus about dissuasion, discouragement and disincentivisation. Contrary to intuition, the fact that India is prepared to suffer damage in order to punish Pakistan makes this strategy all the more credible.
The Pahalgam attacks are a reminder that the task of dissuasion is continuous and multi-pronged. It starts with policies that reduce the impact of a terrorism. It is obvious that the Pakistani establishment uses terrorist attacks not only to trigger a disproportionate security response that alienates the local population in Kashmir, but also to spark communal tensions across the country. To the extent that Indian society is united, harmonious and at peace with itself, even a big terrorist attack will have small political impact.
Second, India should continue to systematically engage Pakistan’s key foreign partners and persuade them that terrorism is not in their interests. Over the past three decades, Indian diplomacy has been successful in getting the United States, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to stop rewarding Rawapindi’s capers. There can be no let up on this front and this is a job for India’s professional diplomats.
Third, intelligence capabilities and security architecture needs constant attention. This is all the more challenging because the restoration of democratic politics and normal life in Jammu and Kashmir requires a relaxation of the security arrangements. It is not surprising that the Pahalgam attacks took place in the period of transition.
Finally, the effective military balance must overwhelmingly be in India’s favour across the Line of Control and the border. This is a corollary of the post-Sindoor normal. It is not just a comparison of numbers of troops and arsenals, but a matter of the size of the qualitative edge. There are indications that China’s support for Pakistani military operations went beyond supplying equipment. This ought to change our calculations of the military balance required to dissuade Rawalpindi’s generals.
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