June 23, 2025 ☼ The Intersection ☼ geopolitics ☼ foreign policy
Air power can destroy. But ground forces are necessary (but not sufficient) to accomplish “regime change”
This is a pre-publication draft of The Intersection column that usually appears every other Monday in Mint.
Now that the United States has entered Israel’s war against Iran by bombing its nuclear installations, its future will hinge on their ability and willingness to put boots on the ground.
There is little doubt that Iran’s ruling ayatollahs have not only been defeated but also shown up to be incompetent. They caused Iran to suffer the pain of sanctions for over two decades but are nowhere close to a bomb. Their approach of using terrorist, sub-conventional and state proxies in Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria has come undone. Iranian missiles and drones have caused some damage in Israel but not enough to deter Tel Aviv from attacking.
That, however, does not mean that the United States and Israel can achieve their political objective of eliminating Iran as a threat to their interests. Indeed, since 1990 — in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Yemen — the United States was able to pummel its targets using its massive air power and dislodge the incumbent regimes, but could not establish its desired political order. Indeed, deploying ground troops did not work either. The US committed thousands of troops and billions of dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan, only to have to withdraw ignominiously, leaving the country in the hands of even more unsavoury regimes than the ones it toppled. Little wonder that public opinion in the United States is strongly against fighting forever wars in far-flung regions.
Proponents of the war in Tel Aviv and Washington suggest that a combination of humiliation, decapitation and denuclearisation will cause Iran’s ruling ayatollahs to be toppled. Even if this were the case, it does not follow that the theocracy will be succeeded by a docile leadership that will surrender to the United States or Israel. The ayatollahs have long been unpopular among the urban middle classes, but there has been a surge of patriotism and nationalism among the Iranian people since Israel launched its air strikes. As much as assassinations of senior military leaders have damaged Iran’s military capability, decapitation could replace the old guard with fresh talent. Israel’s destruction of Gaza has not endeared it to Iranians either. If the incumbent regime does not get a fresh lease of life, it is likely to be succeeded by nationalists or Islamists determined to keep their country united and fight the external aggressors.
If the United States and Israel do not engage in a ground war, they would leave the job half done. If Iran descends into political turmoil — with various militant groups fighting each other for power — then there is a risk that such a conflict will spread across West Asia, destabilising the entire region. It is unclear if the Washington, Tel Aviv or their Arab and European allies have the credibility and diplomatic wherewithal to construct a political order that can stabilise the region. The existence of oil & gas in the region, and its proximity to key transportation bottlenecks will transmit the pain to the rest of the world.
Washington will find few partners ready to commit troops to manage the mess that will result from toppling the Iranian theocracy. The Trump administration has antagonised its NATO allies and the Europeans in any case are preoccupied with tackling the Russian threat. It will be extremely difficult for the Gulf Arab monarchies to be seen supporting Israel.
It is unclear if anyone reminded President Trump of Colin Powell’s Pottery Barn Rule — “you break it, you own it” — before he decided to bomb Iran. The United States is almost at that point. If the Iranians retaliate by targeting US troops in the region, Washington will have to increase its commitment to the war, taking it again to the question of boots on the ground.
Now, it is possible that domestic politics will cause Washington to walk away from the region leaving it in a crisis. In the event, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Pakistan will fill the void either by crossing borders or by backing their proxies not only in Iran but also Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. It is impossible to estimate what the eventual outcome of these wars will be, but it will bring insecurity to Israel and the Gulf Arab states. Oil and insurance prices will rise, affecting the fiscal positions of a number of countries with already tenuous budgets and balance of payments.
The United States might still be a superpower, but it finds itself confronting a strategic dilemma. The more it dissipates its attention, money and military might fighting a Iran, a regional player at best, the less it will have left to counter China, its strategic competitor. On the other hand, withdrawing from the war will further damage its credibility, threaten its allies and exacerbate geo-economic risks.
How President Trump will resolve the dilemma is anybody’s guess. Public opinion in general and in significant sections of his MAGA Republican party base is against entanglement in a foreign war. Whether or not these are strong enough to prevail over the pro-Israel constituencies remains to be seen. It may well be that Mr Trump’s perception of which option will make him look a winner will determine his next steps. I think he was being completely honest when he declared that no one knows what he will do.
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